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Business corporations dominate the U.S. economy. The vast majority of the 
largest businesses are organized as corporations, as are many small businesses. The cor-
porate form, which has “served as the symbolic embodiment of American business,”1 
provides a number of useful features including limited liability for shareholders, trans-
ferability of stock, perpetual existence for the entity, and a governance structure that 
allows for centralized management or what is commonly referred to as the separation 
of ownership and control. Legal personality allows the corporation to hold property, to 
contract, and to sue and be sued in its own name and capacity. Over the past two hun-
dred years, the Supreme Court has recognized that corporations hold many of the same 
rights as individuals under the U.S. Constitution, including, in recent decades, protec-
tions related to commercial and political speech. Business corporations have come to 
represent all of this under the law and in society, but does a business corporation con-
stitute a “person” who can “exercise religion” under the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act of 1993 (RFRA)?2
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This was one of the key questions in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,3 in which 
the Supreme Court held that RFRA applied to three closely held business corpora-
tions, allowing them to claim a religious exemption from providing certain contra-
ceptive coverage to their employees under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act. Before this 2014 case, the Court had entertained free exercise claims brought by 
individual merchants and RFRA claims brought by nonprofit religion-based organi-
zations, but the question remained open as to the RFRA claims of business corpora-
tions (also known as “for-profit” corporations).4
This chapter examines the Supreme Court’s theory and interpretation of business 
corporations and corporate law as embodied in the Hobby Lobby opinion. Although 
the case raised a number of important issues, after discussing the background of the 
case this chapter narrows its focus to the corporate law issues driving the Court’s 
analysis: (1) the theory of the corporation as a right holder; (2) corporate purpose; 
(3) the “closely held” category; and (4) state corporate law as a mechanism for resolv-
ing disputes about a corporation’s religious activity or purpose.
A close examination of these issues shows that the Court’s anemic treatment of 
corporate law in Hobby Lobby provides little guidance on how to implement and limit 
this landmark ruling. The Court, for example, extended RFRA protection to business 
corporations in order to derivatively protect the religious liberty of those who “own 
and control” the corporations, but did not explain why those would be the only corpo-
rate participants whose interests count.5 This approach overlooked minority share-
holders, employees, and the competing interests of corporate participants. Further, 
in recognizing that corporations can pursue goals besides shareholder wealth maxi-
mization, the Court did not make clear whether it understood the pursuit of other 
goals to require contracting around a default rule of governance. This oversight 
leaves unclear the method for determining which business corporations have taken 
sufficient steps to demonstrate a religious purpose or identity. In addition, although 
the Court extensively relied on the “closely held” terminology in seemingly cabining 
its holding, the Court never defined this term for its purposes, and no singular defi-
nition exists in corporate law to clearly limit the scope of Hobby Lobby’s reach. And, 
despite the Court’s instruction to rely on corporate law as a mechanism for resolv-
ing disputes regarding religion among corporate participants, the Court’s analysis 
obscured the role of the board of directors to direct the affairs of the corporation in 
the interests of the corporation and shareholders. As a result, the Hobby Lobby opin-
ion recognizes the religious liberty of business corporations but leaves quite murky 
the corporate law mechanics of establishing and limiting this liberty.
This chapter further argues that although the Hobby Lobby opinion leaves much 
unexplained, it nonetheless adds weight to the work of corporate law in ordering 
3 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
4 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (merchants); Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União 
do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (church).
5 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
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the rights of organizations and their social and religious roles, raising new questions 
for future exploration. With business corporations having more latitude to act in 
political and religious spheres after Citizens United v. FEC6 and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 
should corporate law adjust in some way to better bear this weight? Do these recent 
cases strengthen arguments for regulating corporations through corporate law? Is 
religion different from other social values that might be pursued in business corpora-
tions, such as environmental sustainability and employee safety? Are there socially 
acceptable bounds of allowing business corporations to opt out of generally appli-
cable federal regulations? The chapter concludes by offering several criticisms of the 
Hobby Lobby decision and identifying the difficult questions it has left in its wake.
1. Legal and Factual Background of Hobby Lobby
The Hobby Lobby case arose in response to a provision of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010, which requires employers with fifty or more full-time 
employees to offer health insurance that meets certain minimum coverage stan-
dards, including preventive care for women.7 The Health Resources and Services 
Administration, charged with defining such preventive care standards, included all 
FDA-approved contraceptive methods in its guidelines.8 The Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) provided an exemption for religious employers with reli-
gious objections, such as churches, and an accommodation for other religious non-
profit organizations. The accommodation allowed an eligible organization to notify 
its insurer of a religious objection and to have the insurer separately pay for the 
employees’ contraceptive services.
For-profit business corporations that did not fit into the existing exemption 
or accommodation brought suit to challenge the HHS regulations on the basis 
of their asserted religious liberty. Two of these cases were consolidated before 
the Supreme Court: Conestoga Wood Specialties and Hobby Lobby.9 Conestoga Wood 
Specialties involved a woodworking business organized as a for-profit corpora-
tion under Pennsylvania law. The Hahn family, two parents and three children, 
all of whom are devout members of the Mennonite Church, own all shares of the 
corporation’s stock. The family members also control the corporation’s board of 
directors and one of the sons serves as president and CEO. The business has 950 
employees. The Hahns asserted that their unanimous religious beliefs would be 
violated if Conestoga Wood Specialties complied with the contraceptive provi-
sion of the HHS regulations. According to the Hahns’ religious beliefs, several 
6 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
7 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4).
8 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762.
9 Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d 
Cir. 2013); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
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of the FDA-approved contraceptives constitute “abortifacients,” an immoral and 
sinful termination of a human life.10 As evidence that their religious beliefs were 
incorporated into the governance and operations of the corporation, they referred 
to “Vision and Values Statements” affirming the corporation’s mission to pur-
sue “a reasonable profit in [a] manner that reflects Christian heritage” and to a 
board-adopted “Statement on the Sanctity of Human Life.”11
The other case before the Supreme Court, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., involved two cor-
porations with stock owned by the Green family, two parents and three children, all 
of whom are Christians. One of the corporations, Hobby Lobby, is a nationwide chain 
of arts and crafts stores with more than 500 stores, 13,000 employees, and $3 billion in 
annual revenue.12 The other corporation, Mardel, is a chain of 35 Christian bookstores 
that employs nearly 400 people. Both Hobby Lobby and Mardel are for-profit corpora-
tions incorporated in Oklahoma. The Greens control the stock of both corporations 
through a trust in which the five family members serve as trustees. Green family 
members also serve as executive officers of the corporations. The Greens referred 
to various corporate statements and practices to evidence the incorporation of their 
unanimous religious beliefs into the corporations, including Hobby Lobby’s statement 
of purpose to “operat[e] the company in a manner consistent with Biblical principles” 
and each family member’s written pledge to run the businesses in accordance with 
the family’s religious beliefs.13 Faith-based business practices included closing the 
Hobby Lobby and Mardel stores on Sundays, refusing to do business that facilitates 
or promotes alcohol use, contributing to Christian missionaries and ministries, and 
advertising religious messages. Like the Hahns, the Greens claimed it would violate 
their religious beliefs if Hobby Lobby and Mardel complied with the HHS regulations.
The novel question before the Court was whether RFRA applies to business cor-
porations like Conestoga, Hobby Lobby, and Mardel, and specifically whether the 
HHS regulations violated RFRA as applied to these corporations.14 RFRA prohib-
its the “Government [from] substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion 
10 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759, 2765. The plaintiffs claimed a belief that pregnancy begins at fertil-
ization, rather than implantation, of an egg. See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1122. As Douglas NeJaime 
and Reva Siegel have noted: “By contrast, the scientific community and federal law define pregnancy 
as beginning with the implantation of a fertilized egg in a woman’s uterus. … The methods of con-
traception characterized as abortifacients in Hobby Lobby do not operate post-implantation, and so 
do not cause abortion in the view of medical science or the federal government.” Douglas NeJaime 
& Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 Yale 
L.J. 2516, n.273 (2015).
11 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764.
12 Hobby Lobby, 134 S.  Ct. at 2765; Hobby Lobby Stores, Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/companies/
hobby-lobby-stores/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2014) (noting 23,000 employees, 600 stores, and $3.3 billion 
in annual revenue).
13 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2766.
14 Given its RFRA ruling, the Supreme Court declined to address claims under the Free Exercise Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785 (“The contraceptive mandate, as applied 
to closely held corporations, violates RFRA. Our decision on that statutory question makes it unnec-
essary to reach the First Amendment claim raised by Conestoga and the Hahns.”).
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even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability” unless that action 
constitutes the least restrictive means of serving a compelling governmental inter-
est.15 Thus, the important threshold question was whether business corporations 
are “persons” capable of the “exercise of religion” within the meaning of RFRA. In 
a 5–4 decision, the Court attributed the religious beliefs of the shareholders to the 
corporations and ruled that the HHS regulations violated RFRA as applied to the 
corporations.16
2. Corporate Law and Theory
This part examines the Hobby Lobby ruling from a corporate law perspective. It high-
lights the ambiguities and weaknesses in the Court’s analysis regarding its theory of 
the corporation as a right holder, corporate purpose, “closely held” status, and using 
state corporate law as a mechanism for resolving disputes about a corporation’s reli-
gious activity or purpose. This discussion uncovers hidden problems in the Hobby 
Lobby opinion and underscores the inadequate guidance it provides on how to imple-
ment and limit this landmark ruling.
A. !eory of the Corporation as a Right Holder
The corporate form has a long history, with antecedents dating back to ancient 
Rome.17 By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when chartered joint stock 
companies emerged in Europe, a set of predecessor concepts or elements of the busi-
ness corporation had developed such as transferable shares, locked in capital, and 
limited liability for investors.18 From these important origins came the corporation, 
which Scottish writer Stewart Kyd defined in the eighteenth century as “a collection 
of many individuals, united into one body” that has “perpetual succession under an 
artificial form” and is “vested, by the policy of the law, with the capacity of acting, 
in several respects, as an individual, particularly of taking and granting property, of 
15 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a), (b) (emphasis added). In Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court 
held that “the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with 
a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability’ …” 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). RFRA is a legislative 
response to Smith, with a stated purpose to “restore the compelling interest test” as set forth in 
pre-Smith case law. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(a)(4), (b)(1) (1993).
16 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775, 2785.
17 Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 Harv. 
L.  Rev. 1333, 1358–61 (2006); David A.  Skeel, Jr., Christianity and the Large-Scale Corporation, in 
Christianity and Law 314–15 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 2008); Henry Hansmann, 
Reinier Kraakman, & Richard Squire, Incomplete Organizations: Legal Entities and Asset Partitioning 
in Roman Commerce, (European Corp. Gov. Inst., Working Paper, No. 271, 2014), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2506334; see also Andreas M.  Fleckner, Roman 
Business Associations, in Roman Law and Economics (forthcoming Oxford University Press), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2472598 (discussing Roman business 
associations and distinguishing them from corporations).
18 Hansmann, Kraakman, & Squire, supra note 17, at 1378.
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contracting obligations, and of suing and being sued.”19 Corporations could be “eccle-
siastical” in nature, such as churches and monasteries, or “lay,” which referred to 
“public” corporations such as counties, cities, and towns, and to “private” corpora-
tions engaged in commercial activity.20
Since these beginnings, a foundational principle of the corporate form has been 
legal personality—the separate existence of the corporation as an entity or “legal 
person” under the law. This separate legal identity serves several important func-
tions, including allowing for the perpetual existence of the corporation not tied to 
the life span of any particular individual and for separating pools of assets to lock 
capital into the corporation and limit shareholder liability.21 These features of the 
business corporation encourage investment and enable the pursuit of large-scale and 
long-term ventures.
While state corporate law has established essential corporate characteristics such 
as legal personality, other areas of law have had to address or interpret the treatment 
of corporations including determining whether corporations can be understood as 
holding certain rights. A key example is the question of how to treat corporations 
under the U.S. Constitution, which does not specifically mention corporations in its 
text but does establish rights for “persons,” “people,” and “citizens.”22 Interpretation 
issues also arise under statutory laws, both state and federal, because statutes that 
do not expressly include corporations or define “person” to include corporations may 
give rise to ambiguity that must eventually be interpreted by courts.23
Corporate theory, or various understandings of the nature of corporations, have 
often played a role in these determinations. Scholars have debated whether corporate 
theory should play such a role; whether it is better to inquire into the metaphysical 
or ontological nature of corporations and then deduce whether they are the kinds of 
beings that can or should have rights, or whether it is better to instead take a real-
ist approach that looks at society’s interests and the functional relations involved.24 
19 Stewart Kyd, A Treatise on the Law of Corporations, vol. i, at 2–4, 7, 10, 13 (1793).
20 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law 221 (O. Halsted ed., 1826–1830). For a discus-
sion of the history of business corporations in the United States, see Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth 
Pollman, !e Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1673 (2015).
21 Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood and the Corporate Persona, 2013 U. Ill. Rev. 785; Margaret 
M.  Blair, Locking In Capital:  What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth 
Century, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 387, 423–24 (2003); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, !e Essential 
Role of Organizational Law, 110 Yale L.J. 387, 392–93 (2000).
22 Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Myth of Rights:  The Purposes and Limits of Constitutional 
Rights 10–15 (2010) (noting the absence of textual reference or explanation of the treatment of 
corporations in the Constitution).
23 See, e.g., FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397 (2011) (interpreting whether corporations have a right of 
“personal privacy” for purposes of the Freedom of Information Act’s exemption 7(C)).
24 For a discussion of historically important theorists in the debate on the nature of legal entities, such 
as Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Otto von Gierke, Frederic William Maitland, and Ernst Freund, see 
Martin Petrin, Reconceptualizing the !eory of the Firm: From Nature to Function, 118 Penn St. L. Rev. 
1 (2013). For classic realist work arguing against a deductive methodology focused on the conceptual 
nature of groups, see H. L. A. Hart, De#nition and !eory in Jurisprudence, 70 Law Q. Rev. 37 (1954); 
John Dewey, !e Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 Yale L.J. 655 (1926).
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Scholars have also noted the rhetorical influence of corporate theory25 as well as the 
dynamic process by which corporate theory is created and how it in turn can shape 
social practice.26
Without wading deeper into the normative aspects of these debates about the role 
of theory in corporate rights determinations, we can usefully observe here that a 
few dichotomies or views of the corporation have endured over time and evolved 
into variants on themes highlighting different aspects of the corporate form. One 
set of questions asks whether the corporation has a separate existence, reified or real, 
from the persons connected with it and whether the emphasis in understanding the 
nature of the corporation should be on the separate legal entity or on the aggregate 
of individuals involved.27 This is known in corporate theory debates as the entity/
aggregate dichotomy.28 The entity and aggregate views imply opposing ideas about 
whether it is appropriate to equivocate the corporation and the people behind it in 
rights determinations. Another dichotomy focuses on the corporation’s nature and 
origins as being either “public” or “private.” The public view sees the corporation as 
a concession of the state, tinged with a public purpose and subject to state regula-
tion. The private view sees the corporation as a matter of private contract, property, 
and activity.29 The public/private dichotomy implies opposing viewpoints about the 
appropriateness of regulation and whether corporate rights are those granted by the 
state or arising from the natural persons composing the corporation.
A neoclassical variant of the aggregate or private view sees the corporation as a 
legal fiction that serves as a nexus for contracting among individual factors of pro-
duction.30 Under this “contractarian” view, rooted in economics, the separate legal 
identity of the corporation is given little analytical weight. From this view, neoclas-
sical theorists constructed a model of governance with the shareholders envisioned 
25 For literature examining the rhetorical influence and function of corporate theory in rights analy-
sis, see Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Chapter 17, Some Realism about Corporate Rights, 
in this volume, and Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 Utah L. Rev. 1629.
26 David Millon, !eories of the Corporation, 1990 Duke L.J. 201, 243 (1990) (“Theories about the cor-
poration depend in large part on perceptions of what corporations look like. Law embodies beliefs 
about what is legitimate, and these beliefs influence the way people behave. Legal theory shapes 
social practice and practice informs theory—at the same time.”).
27 Id. at 201; William W.  Bratton, Jr., !e New Economic !eory of the Firm:  Critical Perspectives from 
History, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1475 (1989).
28 Millon, supra note 26, at 201. Sometimes this is also referred to as theorizing the corporation as a 
real entity, fiction, or aggregate. Pollman, supra note 25, at 1660–62.
29 See William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 
261, 264–66 (1992) (discussing how “two quite different and inconsistent” conceptions of the corpo-
ration, as a social institution and as private property, have “coexisted in our thinking over the last 
century”); see also Eric W. Orts, Business Persons: A Legal Theory of the Firm 109–31 (2013) 
(discussing the public/private distinction for business firms).
30 Michael C.  Jensen & William H.  Meckling, !eory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976); Armen A.  Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777, 779 (1972); Frank 
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (1991).
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as “principals” and the managers (directors and officers) as their “agents” who work 
to maximize shareholder value. This picture implies a limited role for corporate law, 
which is largely regarded as a set of contractual defaults aimed at reducing the agency 
costs arising from the diverging interests of shareholders and managers.31
By contrast, a variant on the entity or public view sees the corporation as a social 
institution and provides for a more regulatory conception of corporate law to pro-
mote the interests of various constituencies and the public interest in a richer set 
of social values.32 Early articulations of this stakeholder view provided a theoreti-
cal basis for the corporate social responsibility movement, which has pushed for 
the integration of stakeholders’ social, environmental, and other concerns into the 
operation of corporations.33
The Hobby Lobby litigants and opinion echoed these timeworn theories of the 
corporation. The parties invoked the entity/aggregate dichotomy: The government 
argued that RFRA does not include for-profit corporations within its reach, and the 
family members could not be heard under RFRA because the HHS regulations apply 
to the corporations not the individuals composing them.34 The respondents argued 
that both the family members and their corporations could sue under RFRA because 
“they are indistinguishable for purposes of this case.”35 Writing for the majority, 
Justice Alito began the analysis by reframing the government’s argument as putting 
“merchants to a difficult choice: either give up the right to seek judicial protection of 
their religious liberty or forgo the benefits, available to their competitors, of operat-
ing as corporations.”36 From this start, the opinion placed itself in the perspective 
of the individuals composing the corporation, asking “[i] s there any reason to think 
that the Congress that enacted such sweeping protection put small-business owners 
to the choice that HHS suggests?”37
The answer, according to the majority, is that “Congress provided protection for 
people like the Hahns and Greens by employing a familiar legal fiction: It included 
corporations within RFRA’s definition of ‘persons.’”38 The purpose of the “legal fic-
tion” of the corporation “is to provide protection for human beings.”39 RFRA applies 
to for-profit corporations because “[a] corporation is simply a form of organization 
31 Bratton, supra note 27, at 1480; see also Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The Corporation 
and the Constitution 1–28 (1995) (contrasting the contractual and concession/regulatory theo-
ries of the corporation).
32 Millon, supra note 26, at 201–202, 216.
33 See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145 (1932); see 
also Ronald J. Colombo, The First Amendment and the Business Corporation 59–64, 93–99 
(2014) (discussing corporate social responsibility).
34 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2767 (2014).
35 Brief for Respondents, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354), 2014 
WL 546899 at *32.
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used by human beings to achieve desired ends.”40 Emphasizing the corporation’s 
nature as a legal fiction representing the people composing the corporation reflected 
the aggregate, private, and contractarian sides of the classic dichotomies in corpo-
rate theory. In taking this approach, the Court downplayed the separate legal iden-
tity of the corporation and its public and institutional characteristics.
Further, the Court articulated a view of the corporation as only holding the right 
on a derivative basis.41 In the Court’s words, extending RFRA protection to the cor-
porations “protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and control these 
companies.”42 To argue, as the government did, that the corporation cannot exercise 
religion is “beside the point”: “[C] orporations, ‘separate and apart from’ the human 
beings who own, run, and are employed by them, cannot do anything at all.”43 The 
Court thus emphasized a view of the corporation as an aggregate of individuals and 
as a tool for humans to organize their private activity rather than as an entity with a 
real or reified existence.
While these long-standing themes from corporate theory are relatively clear in the 
opinion, the Court gives little insight into why the people who count in the deriva-
tive analysis are only those who own and control the corporations. In this way, the 
Court drew upon corporate theory to reason about the corporation as a right holder, 
or perhaps for rhetorical purpose in justifying its result, but it did not fully work out 
or explain the application of this theory of the corporation for analyzing religious 
rights. For example, the Court stated:
An established body of law specifies the rights and obligations of the people (includ-
ing shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with a corporation in 
one way or another. When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended 
to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people. For example, 
extending Fourth Amendment protection to corporations protects the privacy inter-
ests of employees and others associated with the company. Protecting corporations 
from government seizure of their property without just compensation protects all 
those who have a stake in the corporations’ financial well-being. And protecting the 
free exercise rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel pro-
tects the religious liberty of the humans who own and control those companies.44
The Court thus generally explained the concept of derivative rights for corpo-
rations by reference to protecting “shareholders, officers, and employees.” And its 
examples identified the people being protected as varying by the right at stake, so 
40 Id.
41 The Supreme Court has a long history of approaching corporate rights as derivative of the persons 
composing the corporation. Blair & Pollman, supra note 20.
42 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
43 Id.
44 Id. (emphasis in original).
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that the Fourth Amendment, which serves to protect privacy interests, is extended 
to protect “employees and others associated with the company,” and property protec-
tions are extended to protect “all those who have a stake in the corporation’s finan-
cial well-being.” The Court followed this logic of derivative rights in asserting that 
protecting the free exercise rights of the Hobby Lobby corporations would protect the 
people involved in these corporations.
But it did not explain why the relevant people to protect with corporate religious 
rights would be only those who own and control the corporations. Why not consider 
the interests of minority shareholders? In Hobby Lobby, the shareholders were unani-
mous in their beliefs, but the Court’s phrasing could be interpreted to suggest that the 
aim of protection was only the shareholders who control a corporation. In corporate 
law, the concept of control generally refers to shareholders who hold sufficient voting 
power to elect a majority of the corporation’s board of directors, which manages the 
corporation’s affairs in its own business judgment. The Court did not explain why 
this level of stock ownership and voting power was significant for purposes of RFRA 
protection and why minority shareholders would not be included.
Furthermore, why not also consider the interests of employees? Some of the 
Court’s examples involved protecting employees, yet the Court ignored them here 
despite the issue at stake concerning employee healthcare benefits.
Finally, the Court’s derivative rights logic elided the competing interests among 
corporate participants. With the Court’s examples of Fourth Amendment rights and 
protection from government seizure of property, it seems likely that the people asso-
ciated with the corporation would have common interests that are being protected. 
Not so with rights pertaining to religious exercise because the people associating 
through the corporate form might have common economic interests in the business 
but varying religious beliefs. To be sure, we could imagine reasons why the religious 
convictions of the shareholders who control the corporation might be privileged 
above those of others, but the Court did not explain why this would be so nor does its 
implicit theory of the corporation imply a reason.
In sum, the Court’s opinion relied upon corporate theory in justifying the exten-
sion of rights to corporations, but this theory only partially explained the Court’s 
analytic choices and gives somewhat limited visibility into future jurisprudence on 
corporate religious liberty. As a result, there is significant space for scholarly work to 
interpret and theorize answers to the difficult questions of which people associated 
with the corporation should count for corporate rights determinations and what to 
do when people associated with the corporation have competing interests.45
45 For a sampling of literature that is developing on this topic, see Elizabeth Sepper, Taking Conscience 
Seriously, 98 Va. L. Rev. 1501, 1563–71 (2012) (arguing that size, internal cohesion, and organizational 
message should play a role in determining institutional claims of conscience); James D.  Nelson, 
Conscience, Incorporated, 2013 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1565, 1617–18 (analyzing how the legal, social, and 
economic norms of business corporations undermine the formation of a constitutive community 
among corporate constituents); Blair & Pollman, supra note 20 (discussing which corporate partici-
pants should count in corporate rights analysis).
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B. Corporate Purpose
In addition to leaving much unexplained regarding its theory of the business corpora-
tion as a religious right holder, the Hobby Lobby Court also engaged the long-standing 
debate of corporate purpose and left a key point unclear. To fully understand this 
point and why it matters, some background is in order.
The question of corporate purpose has divided corporate law scholars for nearly a 
century. For what purpose, or to what end, is the business corporation to be run? At 
one end of the spectrum are scholars who maintain that the law requires business 
corporations to be run so as to maximize shareholder wealth.46 At the other end of 
the spectrum are scholars who assert that the purpose of the business corporation 
is not to maximize shareholder wealth or value; instead, the law gives the board of 
directors discretion to run the corporation with other goals in mind, including serv-
ing the interests of the public and various stakeholders.47 In between these ends of 
the spectrum are scholars who assert, for example, that the law is ambivalent about 
corporate purpose,48 and that the law requires only that the board not disregard 
shareholder interests for those of nonshareholders.49
The reference points in the corporate purpose debate are by now predictable, 
including: statutory law about the legal powers of a corporation “to conduct or pro-
mote any lawful business or purposes”;50 fiduciary duty law which specifies that 
directors owe fiduciary obligations to “the corporation and its shareholders”;51 case 
law espousing a shareholder value view such as the classic 1919 case Dodge v. Ford 
Motor Co.,52 hostile takeover cases from the 1980s,53 and the more recent Delaware 
46 E.g., Stephen M.  Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice 
53 (2008); David G. Yosifon, "e Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 181, 184 (2013). 
Sometimes the term “shareholder primacy” is used interchangeably with shareholder wealth maxi-
mization, but “shareholder primacy” is less precise because it can also refer to the different question 
of who is ultimately in control of the corporation. Bainbridge, supra, at 53, 57.
47 Lynn Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth:  How Putting Shareholders First Harms 
Investors, Corporations, and the Public (2012) (arguing that corporate law does not mandate 
shareholder primacy or the shareholder wealth maximization norm); Einer Elhauge, Sacri#cing 
Corporate Pro#ts in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733, 738 (2005) (arguing that corporate man-
agers “have always had some legal discretion (implicit or explicit) to sacrifice corporate profits in the 
public interest”).
48 Christopher M. Bruner, "e Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 Ala. L. Rev. 1385, 1386 (2008).
49 David Millon, Team Production "eory: A Critical Appreciation, in Micro-Symposium on Competing 
Theories of Corporate Governance, 62 UCLA L. Rev. Discourse 66, 79–80 (2014).
50 Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 101(b) (West 2014); see also 1A William Meade Fletcher et al., Fletcher 
Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 102 (2014).
51 E.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280, 1287 (Del. 1989); Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 
2 A.2d 225, 238 (Del. Ch. 1938), a$ ’d sub nom. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). Compare Rev. 
Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.30(a) (2010) (stating each member of the board shall act “in a manner the 
director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation”).
52 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
53 E.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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case eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark;54 the business judgment rule insulating 
directors from liability for their decisions provided they meet certain basic condi-
tions;55 and constituency statutes, corporate charitable donation statutes and cases, 
and the recent development in many states of social enterprise business forms such 
as the benefit corporation.56 Scholars across the spectrum of the debate use and con-
test the meaning of these points of law in order to support their interpretations of 
whether corporate law mandates shareholder wealth maximization as the default 
rule of governance.
The issue of corporate purpose arose in Hobby Lobby in response to the govern-
ment’s argument that RFRA does not include for-profit corporations within its reach. 
Attempting to draw a bright line between for-profit business corporations and reli-
gious nonprofit corporations, the government asserted that the former are run “to 
make a profit,” whereas the latter are run to “perpetuate a religious values-based mis-
sion.”57 While a history of religious exemptions existed for churches and nonprofit 
religious organizations, business corporations were not part of this history because 
when they enter “the commercial, profit-making world,” they are understood to “sub-
mit themselves to legislation.”58 Business corporations have “never been regarded 
under the Religion Clauses, or in our societal and legal traditions, as institutions 
with their own freestanding religious identity.”59 The government thus painted a pic-
ture of business corporations as operating in a secular sphere with an objective to 
make a profit for shareholders that precludes an ability to exercise religion or perpet-
uate religious values. Faced with this argument, the Court had to determine whether 
“for-profit” status prevents business corporations from exercising religion within 
the meaning of RFRA.
To answer this question, the Court looked to state corporate law and concluded 
that the government’s argument “flies in the face of modern corporate law.”60 The 
Court referenced common points from the corporate purpose debate, such as state 
54 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010); see also In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 37 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“[T] he 
duty of loyalty therefore mandates that directors maximize the value of the corporation over the 
long-term for the benefit of the providers of equity capital, as warranted for an entity with per-
petual life in which the residual claimants have locked in their investment.”).
55 E.g., Shlensky v.  Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, "e 
Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 437, 
444–45 (1993).
56 E.g., 15 Pa. C.S.A. § 1715 (2014) (providing that in considering the best interests of the corporation 
the board of directors may consider nonshareholder interests); Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 122(9) 
(West 2014) (articulating corporations’ power to engage in charitable giving); A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. 
v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953) (case law on charitable giving); Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, §§ 361–368 
(benefit corporation legislation).
57 Brief for Petitioners, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354), 2014 
WL 173486 at *19 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
58 Reply Brief for Petitioners, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354), 
2014 WL 985095 at *6–7 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
59 Id. at *8.
60 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2770.
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statutory law that allows corporations to “act for any lawful purpose or business” and 
corporate support for charitable causes and other social values. It explained:
While it is certainly true that a central objective of for-profit corporations is 
to make money, modern corporate law does not require for-profit corpora-
tions to pursue profit at the expense of everything else, and many do not do 
so. For-profit corporations, with ownership approval, support a wide variety of 
charitable causes, and it is not at all uncommon for such corporations to fur-
ther humanitarian or other altruistic objectives. Many examples come readily 
to mind. So long as its owners agree, a for-profit corporation may take costly 
pollution-control and energy-conservation measures that go beyond what the 
law requires. A for-profit corporation that operates facilities in other countries 
may exceed the requirements of local law regarding working conditions and 
benefits. If for-profit corporations may pursue such worthy objectives, there 
is no apparent reason why they may not further religious objectives as well.61
Although the Court’s conclusion is clear that “for-profit” status does not preclude 
RFRA protection, its language was ambiguous as to whether it understood corpo-
rate law to require shareholder wealth maximization as a default rule or not. The 
above language stressed that corporations can and do pursue a variety of purposes 
besides maximizing profits. However, the inclusion of the phrases “with ownership 
approval” and “[s] o long as its owners agree,” also makes plausible an interpreta-
tion that the Court understood state corporate law to mandate shareholder wealth 
maximization as a default rule of governance, which can be altered by shareholder 
approval. Evidencing this ambiguity, scholars from both ends of the spectrum have 
claimed that Hobby Lobby endorses their position in the corporate purpose debate.62
Aside from academic debates, why does the Court’s ambiguity about corporate 
purpose matter? As a matter of precedent, because corporate purpose is within the 
61 Id. at 2771.
62 Compare Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 Bus. Lawyer 1, 22–23 
(2015) (claiming that Hobby Lobby “renounced the widely (though not universally) held view that 
maximization of profits is legally mandated as the sole corporate purpose”), and Brett McDonnell, 
!e Liberal Case for Hobby Lobby, at 6 & n.18, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2513380 (argu-
ing that Hobby Lobby endorsed an interpretation of corporate law that allows for the pursuit of 
a wide variety of ends without explicit shareholder approval), with Stephen M.  Bainbridge, Does 
Hobby Lobby Sound a Death Knell for Dodge v.  Ford Motor Co.?, ProfessorBainbridge (July 3, 
2014), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/07/does-hobby-lobby- 
sound-a-death-knell-for-dodge-v-ford-motor-co.html (arguing that Hobby Lobby stands for the 
principle that shareholders of a closely held corporation can alter default rules of corporate law 
such as corporate purpose, but that the case should not be understood as changing the default 
rule), and Alan Meese, Hobby Lobby and Corporate Social Responsibility: A View from the Right, The 
Conglomerate (July 16, 2014), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2014/07/hobby-lobby-and-
corporate-social-responsibility-a-view-from-the-right.html (arguing that Hobby Lobby is consistent 
with shareholder primacy).
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purview of state corporate law, the U.S. Supreme Court’s views on this topic would 
not be binding in a corporate law dispute. Nonetheless, the Court’s opinion could 
serve as persuasive authority for judges inclined to follow it, and the opinion’s lack 
of clarity could lead to further conflict or murkiness in this area of law. It is possible 
that the Court’s ambiguity could be understood as legitimating or endorsing the pur-
suit of noneconomic goals by business corporations and could in some way lead to 
increased activity in this vein.63
Moreover, the Court’s ambiguity on corporate purpose matters because it makes 
it difficult to operationalize the Hobby Lobby ruling, and it cedes to other govern-
ment actors important decision-making about the scope of religious liberty. After 
the Court handed down its decision, the Department of Health and Human Services 
began a rule-making process for defining eligible organizations for religious accom-
modation consistent with Hobby Lobby and identifying “whether other steps might be 
appropriate to implement this policy.”64 The next section discusses eligible organiza-
tions, but here we can observe that the Court’s opinion does not provide guidance on 
whether formal shareholder action is required to approve the pursuit of noneconomic 
goals, or the specific requirements or mechanics for that shareholder approval and 
whether it could vary by state. The three corporations in Hobby Lobby had various 
informal corporate documents such as statements of purpose and individual written 
pledges, but did not have formal written shareholder agreements, or provisions in 
the articles of incorporation or bylaws concerning religious purpose. In each of these 
corporations, the shareholders were all members of a single family and unanimous in 
their religious beliefs, and so concerns of a minority or dissenting shareholder were 
not pressed, but the Court’s inattention to these corporate law matters could leave 
an uncomfortable fit between federal statutory corporate religious liberty and each 
state’s corporate law.
C. !e “Closely Held” Corporation
The term “closely held” pervades the Hobby Lobby opinion from beginning to end. The 
first line of the opinion frames the issue as to the “three closely held corporations” 
involved, and the opinion concludes simply at the end: “The contraceptive mandate, 
as applied to closely held corporations, violates RFRA.”65 In addition to extensively 
using the “closely held” terminology, the opinion repeatedly refers to the sharehold-
ers as “owners” and “small-business owners,”66 and emphasizes their connection as 
63 See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 62; Johnson & Millon, supra note 62.
64 Press Release, HHS, Administration Takes Steps to Ensure Women’s Continued Access to 
Contraception Coverage, While Respecting Religious-Based Objections (Aug. 22, 2014), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2014pres/08/20140822a.html.
65 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785.
66 Id. at 2759, 2767.
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family members.67 Further, in response to the government’s argument that Congress 
did not intend RFRA to include for-profit corporations because it is difficult to ascer-
tain their religious identity, particularly for large, publicly traded corporations, the 
Court noted that Hobby Lobby did not involve publicly traded corporations and it is 
“unlikely” that such “corporate giants” would “often” assert RFRA claims.68 The Court 
added, “the idea that unrelated shareholders—including institutional investors with 
their own set of stakeholders—would agree to run a corporation under the same 
religious beliefs seems improbable.”69 The Court’s framing and terminology, as well 
as its contrasting with public corporations, raise the question: Was the Hobby Lobby 
ruling limited to closely held corporations? And how is that term defined in the law?
Again, as with other issues of corporate law in Hobby Lobby, the Court’s treatment 
was impoverished, and so the importance of a corporation being closely held for pur-
poses of religious liberty is unclear. The Court never defined the term “closely held 
corporation” nor cited to a source defining it. There is, in fact, no singular definition 
of this term in corporate law. It is typically understood to refer to a corporation with 
a small number of shareholders whose shares are not readily transferable and who 
are often involved in managing the corporation.70 Fewer than half the states have a 
statutorily created “closely held” business form and the requirements vary from state 
to state,71 for example, varying in the limit on the number of shareholders from ten 
to fifty.72 These statutory forms are not commonly used,73 however, and none of the 
Hobby Lobby plaintiffs elected statutory close corporation status.74
The “closely held” concept might also be understood by reference to what it is not. 
Clearly outside the boundary of what “closely held” might refer to we have the con-
cept of a “public” corporation, which is defined by federal securities laws enacted 
with the aim of investor protection and market integrity. In simple terms, a company 
67 See, e.g., id. at 2774 (“The companies in the cases before us are closely held corporations, each owned 




70 See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Corporations and Other Business Organizations 338 
(8th ed. 2000); Stephen M.  Bainbridge, Corporate Law 442 (2d ed. 2009); Douglas K.  Moll, 
Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: "e Unanswered Question of Perspective, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 
749, 756 (2000).
71 1A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 70.10 (2014).
72 See Az. Rev. Stat. §§ 10-1801 et seq. (2014); Ga. Code Ann. § 14-2-902 (2014); Mo. Rev. Stat.  
§ 351.755 (2014).
73 Harwell Wells, "e Rise of the Close Corporation and the Making of Corporation Law, 5 Berkeley Bus. 
L.J. 263, 314 (2008) (“While fifteen states eventually adopted integrated statutes, remarkably few 
close corporations chose to take advantage of them. Empirical studies show that only a very small 
percentage of corporations ever registered as statutory close corporations.”).
74 Brief for Respondents, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354), 2014 
WL 546899 at *8 (“Hobby Lobby and Mardel remain closely held family businesses, organized as 
general corporations under Oklahoma law …”); Joint Appendix, Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. 
v.  Sebelius (No. 13-356), 2014 WL 5151398 at *72 (reflecting Conestoga’s election in its articles of 
incorporation for “business-stock” rather than “business-statutory close” status).
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becomes subject to federal public reporting requirements by listing securities on a 
national securities exchange, by making a public offering of securities, or by reaching 
a certain size as measured by company assets ($10 million) and number of sharehold-
ers of record (2,000).75 Public corporations are thus generally characterized by having 
a large number of shareholders and stock traded on a public exchange, which leads 
to what many scholars have called a separation of ownership and control—that is, 
passive shareholders and a separate hierarchy of managers topped by the board of 
directors to carry out the management of corporate affairs.76
As there is no singular definition or uniform corporate law on closely held corpora-
tions, the notion of the closely held corporation invoked by the Court appears to turn 
on more colloquial usage or a general understanding that such a corporation has a 
small number of shareholders united in ownership and control of the business enter-
prise. The Court’s phrasing, and its lack of attention to the role of the board of directors 
in managing the affairs of the corporation, suggests that it conceptually equivocated 
closely held corporations with small businesses or partnerships in which the owners, 
related in some way to each other, are engaged in running the business together.
But because the Court did not pinpoint which characteristics were required for its 
ruling, it is not clear that the closely held category will limit future cases, particularly 
as it is not a uniformly defined term in the law. And although it is reasonable for 
the Court to resolve the dispute before it and leave other questions for a later day, 
the Court’s reasoning and language were more expansive than would be necessary 
to resolve the current case. Family ownership arguably assures an intimacy or asso-
ciational dynamic among the shareholders, as might stock ownership and control 
being united in a small number of shareholders, but as much as these characteristics 
might provide a conceptual grounding for derivative religious liberty rights for the 
corporation, the Court did not explicitly state they are necessary for RFRA stand-
ing.77 The Court expressed doubt that a public corporation would bring a RFRA claim, 
75 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l(a) & 78o(d). The JOBS Act recently increased the size threshold of section 12(g) of the 
Securities Exchange Act to companies with $10 million in assets and 2,000 shareholders of record (so 
long as no more than 499 of those are “non-accredited” as defined by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission). Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”), Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501, 126 
Stat. 306, 325 (2012); 17 C.F.R. 230.501 (2013).
76 Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means famously observed the separation of ownership and control as a 
key characteristic of the public corporation in the modern era. Adolf A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner 
C.  Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932). “Private” companies are 
those that are not subject to the public reporting requirements. As current securities laws allow 
for up to 2,000 shareholders of record before a company is forced to go public, private companies 
often have a significantly larger number of shareholders than permitted under state closely held 
statutes and also a separation of stock ownership and control. Thus, “private” corporation could 
be understood as a broader conceptual category than “closely held.” For a discussion of the range of 
private corporations, see Elizabeth Pollman, Team Production !eory and Private Company Boards, 38 
Seattle U. L. Rev. 619 (2015).
77 The Court also did not use the corporate law doctrine of veil piercing to determine when the cor-
porate form should be disregarded, as suggested in Stephen M.  Bainbridge, Using Reverse Piercing 
to Vindicate the Free Exercise Rights of Incorporated Employers, 16 Green Bag 2d 235 (2013). In the 
corporate law context, veil piercing has been long criticized. See, e.g., Peter B.  Oh, Veil-Piercing, 
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but nothing in the Court’s logic imposed this limit besides the Court’s indication that 
the shareholders would have to agree to run the corporation under the same religious 
beliefs. Therefore, a prudent, narrow approach might implement Hobby Lobby based 
on the Court’s emphasis on the small number of shareholders associating for a reli-
gious purpose, but future jurisprudence is not so clearly limited.
D. State Corporate Law as a Mechanism for Resolving Disputes about  
a Corporation’s Religious Activity or Purpose
Finally, we turn to the last important issue of corporate law and theory in Hobby 
Lobby. As we saw in the above discussion, the Court determined that a business corpo-
ration can pursue religious objectives at the expense of profits “[s] o long as its owners 
agree.”78 Later in the opinion, the Court acknowledged that “the owners of a company 
might well have a dispute relating to religion,” but disposed of this concern by noting 
that “[s]tate corporate law provides a ready means for resolving any conflicts by, for 
example, dictating how a corporation can establish its governing structure.”79
With this seemingly small point, we confront a large difficulty. There is no federal 
general common law of corporations. Instead, corporate law has been historically 
within the purview of the states and the Court’s deference to it here respects that 
boundary. However, the result is that state corporate law which has been created to 
govern the internal business relations of a corporation—the relationship of share-
holders and the board of directors—will now provide the rules which ultimately 
determine whether a corporation will be ascribed religious beliefs and have a claim 
for exemption from generally applicable federal regulation. And the Court’s opinion, 
which did not delineate the separate roles of the shareholders and the board, provided 
no further elaboration on which rules of corporate law are relevant for purposes of 
corporate religious liberty. The Court also did not square its reasoning in recognizing 
RFRA standing—to protect those who “own and control” the corporations—with the 
mechanics and structure created by corporate law.
Under state corporate law, for example, the shareholders and the board of direc-
tors have legally distinct roles and obligations. Shareholders do not have the author-
ity to direct the business and affairs for the corporation. The board acts for the 
corporation, in its capacity as a collective body, or through delegation of authority 
to officers and other individuals.80 Shareholders are not involved in their capacity as 
89 Tex. L. Rev. 81, 84 (2010) (noting veil piercing “has been a scourge on corporate law” and “has 
resulted in a doctrinal mess”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. Corp. L. 479, 506 
(2001) (describing veil piercing as a “dysfunctional doctrine” and arguing that it should be abolished).
78 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014).
79 Id. at 2775.
80 See, e.g., 2 Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 505 (2014) (“The board of directors controls the corporate business 
and authorizes the corporation’s executive agents to enter into contracts and new business ven-
tures. . . . Thus, the business and affairs of the corporation are managed by and under the direction 
of its board.”).
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shareholders except to elect directors, amend the certificate of incorporation or bylaws, 
and vote on fundamental transactions such as mergers.81 Shareholders do not otherwise 
have a role in directing a corporation’s business and affairs.
The separate roles of the board and the shareholders inevitably lead to the question of 
whether the board has the power to determine a religious purpose for the corporation. 
The opinion is unclear on this point, and, as discussed above, scholars disagree about 
whether corporate law requires shareholder wealth maximization as a default.
If the board has discretion to pursue values besides profits, including the exercise of 
religion, then the board could decide to pursue religious objectives different from those 
of the shareholders. A corporate exercise of religion that is different from the beliefs 
of the shareholders does not fit with the Court’s logic that the corporation’s derivative 
right protects those who “own and control” the corporation, nor the Court’s attribution 
of the shareholders’ beliefs to the corporation.82 The shareholders’ recourse would be 
to “control” the corporation—elect new directors at the next annual meeting or at a 
special meeting, and those new directors would again exercise their own discretion in 
managing the corporation. Further, if the shareholders were not unanimous in their 
religious beliefs, the board would have to determine how to give effect to the concerns 
of the minority shareholders and fulfill their fiduciary duties as directors to “the cor-
poration and its shareholders.” Corporate law does not provide a clear path to fulfilling 
the religious dictates (or political or social preferences) of a diverse shareholder body.
If shareholder consent is sufficient or required for determining the religious pur-
pose of the corporation, must it be unanimous? Again, we face a question not as 
readily answered as the Court suggested. It might vary by state and depend on what 
type of action is considered sufficient to express a religious purpose for the corpo-
ration. Under state corporate law, the individuals setting up the corporation may 
customize the purpose, conduct of business, or rules of governance by adopting pro-
visions in the certificate of incorporation.83 A certificate of incorporation could also 
be amended to include a provision regarding religious purpose so long as the board 
adopts a resolution proposing such change and a majority of the outstanding stock 
entitled to vote approves.84 Shareholders could also include a provision in the bylaws, 
which may be approved by either the board or a majority vote of the outstanding 
stock.85 Shareholders may also enter into written agreements that could bind the 
81 See Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise 11, 288–89 (1996) (noting that shareholder 
voting “is not to provide a means for conveying the patrons’ preferences to the firm’s management, 
but rather to make it more difficult for the firm to exploit those patrons as a class. . . .[t] o give the 
electorate some crude protection from gross opportunism on the part of those in power”).
82 The concept of complicity may also be weakened where the board is independent of its sharehold-
ers. For discussion of conscience and complicity in the corporate context, see NeJaime & Siegel, 
supra note 10; Amy Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity: Assessing Pleas for Religious Exemptions After 
Hobby Lobby, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2496218.
83 E.g., Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 102(b)(1), (a)(3) (West 2014).
84 E.g., id. § 242(b).
85 E.g., id. § 109.
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corporation, with requirements varying by state, including a unanimity standard in 
some jurisdictions.86
However, while corporate law allows for customizing governance rules, and many 
such methods require only a majority vote, the protection of minority shareholders 
is also a principle of corporate law. Where there is a controlling shareholder who acts 
for his or her own exclusive benefit to the detriment of minority shareholders, the 
controlling shareholder breaches the fiduciary duty of loyalty unless he or she can 
show that the act was entirely fair to minority shareholders.87 Controlling sharehold-
ers are thereby constrained to act equitably and in the interest of all shareholders.88
Furthermore, the Hobby Lobby opinion relies on the logic that the beliefs of the 
shareholders can be attributed to the corporation, and it is not clear that this logic 
would hold where shareholders are divided on a religious issue. Is it still “a person’s 
exercise of religion” if only the will of the majority of the shareholders is expressed 
and not others who have conflicting interests and values?89 The Court’s theory of the 
corporation as a right holder might be in tension with the notion that state corporate 
law can resolve any dispute related to religion.
3. The Impact of Hobby Lobby on Corporate Law
The above discussion has engaged with the corporate law issues and theory driving 
the Court’s conclusion that business corporations have standing to bring religious 
liberty claims under RFRA. What, in turn, is the impact of Hobby Lobby on corporate 
law? This final section concludes with reflections on this question, criticisms of the 
Hobby Lobby decision, and new paths for future exploration.
Most significantly, while Hobby Lobby left much unexplained with regard to cor-
porate law and theory, the case nonetheless clearly illustrates what we might now 
understand as a trend of adding weight to the work of corporate law. The Supreme 
86 Id. § 350 (votes representing the majority of outstanding shares may bind a close corporation); Rev. 
Model Bus. Corp. Act § 7.32 (2010) (allowing shareholders to substantially modify the default rules 
of corporate governance with unanimous shareholder approval).
87 E.g., 12B Fletcher Cyc. Corp. §§ 5810–5811 (2014); see also Moll, supra note 70 (discussing the share-
holder oppression doctrine).
88 See Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise, 113 Yale L.J. 119, 124 (2003) (arguing 
that corporate law is “a device to ensure that minorities will be treated fairly”); D. Gordon Smith, 
&e Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. Corp. L. 277, 305–22 (1998) (arguing the shareholder primacy 
norm was first used to resolve disputes among shareholders in closely held corporations and this use 
evolved into the modern doctrine of minority oppression).
89 See Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 Tex. 
L. Rev. 209, 232 (1994) (noting that RFRA’s “legislative history is relatively clear … that the bill 
would protect conduct that was religiously ‘motivated’”); Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Pro'ts: Is &ere 
Religious Liberty for Moneymakers?, 21 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 59, 66 (2013) (“[T] he key to determining 
whether a particular action is a religious exercise is determining whether religious belief motivates 
the act.”).
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Court has long accorded constitutional rights to corporations,90 but the recent deci-
sions of Citizens United and Hobby Lobby have provided corporations more latitude 
than ever before to act in political and religious spheres based on a reliance on the 
mechanisms of corporate governance that were not designed to shape or constrain 
corporate activity in these domains.
The Court’s earliest decisions according constitutional protections to corpora-
tions, through the nineteenth century, involved property and contract rights.91 These 
protections were closely related to the economic purposes for which business cor-
porations operated: Recognizing the corporate charter as protected by the Contract 
Clause and the corporate property as covered within the scope of the Due Process 
Clause stabilized the corporation as a form of business organization suited for 
long-term private investment, with separate existence from the government.92 Early 
twentieth-century case law recognized corporations as subject to criminal liability 
and as having some, but not all, of the related protections concerning searches and 
trials.93 With limited exception, constitutional protections for business corporations 
in social, political, and religious realms did not arise until the 1970s.94 Since that time, 
the Court has successively expanded speech rights for corporations, culminating 
recently in Citizens United, which further freed business corporations from campaign 
finance restrictions on political spending. Hobby Lobby represents a new landmark; 
allowing, for the first time, business corporations to claim religious accommodation 
to avoid compliance with generally applicable federal regulation.
Under the weight of Citizens United and Hobby Lobby, corporate law becomes the 
mechanism not just for ordering business affairs but also for making decisions about 
corporate political spending and sorting corporations that might seek religious 
accommodation. Citizens United left the question of who speaks and how corporate 
participants are protected to “the procedures of corporate democracy.”95 As explained 
in this chapter, Hobby Lobby likewise leaned on state corporate law to determine the 
religious identity of a corporation and resolve disputes among corporate participants.
In this way, part of the broader significance of Hobby Lobby is that it adds weight 
to the work of corporate law and shines a light on what corporate law does and does 
not do. Corporate law governs the internal relations of the corporation with a focus 
90 Blair & Pollman, supra note 20 (tracing two hundred years of Supreme Court jurisprudence on cor-
porate constitutional rights).
91 Id.
92 Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 Utah L. Rev. 1629, 1639.
93 Blair & Pollman, supra note 20.
94 Id. Until this time, “First Amendment protections had been extended to corporations primarily in 
the narrow context of media corporations and claims brought by the NAACP in the civil rights era.” 
Id. at 1719.
95 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361–62 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); 
see also First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978). For an explanation of how 
“the procedures of corporate democracy” in fact offer little to no relief for dissenting shareholders, 
see Elizabeth Pollman, Citizens Not United: "e Lack of Stockholder Voluntariness in Corporate Political 
Speech, 119 Yale L.J. Online 53 (2009).
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on the shareholders and the board of directors. Corporate law does not provide a 
voice for other corporate stakeholders, and it does not regulate corporations’ rela-
tions with the external world. More than a century ago, states eased restrictions that 
regulated corporate behavior through their charters and various doctrines of corpo-
rate law.96 Corporations instead became primarily regulated by regimes outside of 
corporate law.97 For instance, state corporate law does not take into consideration 
or provide a voice for employees who do not share in the moral or religious commit-
ments of the corporation’s board or shareholders.98 Employee protections are left to 
employment and labor law and other areas outside of corporate law. Likewise with 
consumers and other business participants—their concerns are dealt with by legal 
frameworks outside of corporate law.
In a post–Hobby Lobby environment in which business corporations can seek 
religious accommodations from generally applicable laws, we might consider anew 
the merits of relying on areas outside of corporate law to regulate corporations.99 
Corporate law might function well as a tool for organizing business endeavors, but it 
was not designed to aggregate and protect the nonbusiness interests of various par-
ticipants. Further, if the choices that individuals make as investors, employees, and 
consumers are understood as expressing values beyond economics, we might place 
greater importance on sorting and facilitating decision-making about corporations.100
Hobby Lobby raises still more questions. Some scholars have lauded Hobby Lobby as 
a win for progressive values because of its recognition that business corporations can 
pursue goals other than shareholder profits and its implication for the larger realm 
of corporate social responsibility.101 But the question of whether religion is different 
from other social values such as environmental sustainability or employee protec-
tions has not been fully grappled with in the corporate context.102
96 Lyman Johnson, Law and the History of Corporate Responsibility:  Corporate Governance, 10 U. St. 
Thomas L.J. 974, 975 (2013); Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate 
Illegality (With Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 Va. L. Rev. 
1279 (2001).
97 Winkler, supra note 1, at 110–11.
98 Nelson, supra note 45, at 1609–10; Kent Greenfield, "e Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. 
L. Rev. 283, 283–85 (1998).
99 Further, for an argument that Citizens United “undermines conservative corporate theory’s reli-
ance upon the regulatory process as an adequate safeguard against corporate overreaching,” see 
Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course? "e Tension Between Conservative 
Corporate Law "eory and Citizens United, 100 Cornell L. Rev. 335, 342 (2015).
100 For example, the role of disclosure deserves further study. The Delaware approach to benefit corpo-
ration law allows for a religious purpose, but requires disclosure of the corporation’s public benefit 
purpose, religious or otherwise, in its certificate of incorporation. Whereas some states require the 
public disclosure of a benefit report and/or the submission of the benefit report to the secretary of 
state, Delaware requires only a statement to the shareholders every two years. Del. Code Ann. Tit. 
8, § 366(b) (West 2013).
101 Johnson & Millon, supra note 62; McDonnell, supra note 62.
102 For a discussion in the context of religion and law, see Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion? 
(2013); Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1351 (2012).
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Simply put, Hobby Lobby is about opting out. It is not about doing more than the 
law requires, as is usually the case with corporate social responsibility. Whereas 
the pursuit of corporate social responsibility often entails questions of whether the 
board of directors can put nonshareholder interests ahead of those of shareholders 
in order to surpass legal compliance, the pursuit of religious accommodation asks the 
law to bend around the shareholders’ will to avoid generally applicable laws.
As Elizabeth Sepper recently commented, before Hobby Lobby, courts had resisted 
businesses’ claims to religious exemptions, and even religious organizations were 
not excused from wage-and-hour laws despite contrary religious belief.103 Legislative 
exemptions for business corporations on the basis of religious liberty had been 
“virtually nonexistent.”104 For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act includes an 
exemption that allows religious employers to favor their co-adherents with respect 
to certain limited activities, but courts to date have narrowly interpreted it as cover-
ing churches and faith-based nonprofit corporations.105 A growing number of states 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and to date none have 
exempted business corporations from compliance.106 Hobby Lobby takes the unprec-
edented step of exempting business corporations from an employee-protective law 
in the name of the religious liberty of shareholders. We must more deeply question 
whether allowing corporations to avoid laws based on the religious objections of 
shareholders should be put in the same conceptual category as allowing corporations 
to meet legal requirements and take additional actions at the expense of profits.
We might also question whether there is a limit to the socially acceptable bounds of 
allowing business corporations to opt out of federal regulation. In the securities law 
context, scholars have begun to examine the concept of “publicness”—when a private 
enterprise should be forced to take on public status—in theorizing the public-private 
divide.107 Likewise here we might consider whether corporations with a significant 
impact on society should be forced to comply with generally applicable regulation, 
regardless of whether their motives are driven by profit or other objectives. As Justice 
Ginsburg noted in her dissent, “‘[c] losely held’ is not synonymous with ‘small.’”108 
103 Elizabeth Sepper, Reports of Accommodation’s Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 128 Harv. 
L. Rev. F. 24, 25 (2014).
104 Id. at 26.
105 See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-1(a) (2006) (“This subchapter shall not apply … to a religious corporation, 
association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a 
particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, associa-
tion, educational institution, or society of its activities.”); Ronald J. Colombo, !e Naked Private 
Square, 51 Hous. L. Rev. 1, 13–14 (2013). Cf. Rienzi, supra note 89, at 92 (acknowledging that busi-
ness corporations have not received the Title VII exemption to date but arguing that no categorical 
rule prevents this result).
106 Sepper, supra note 103, at 26.
107 Donald C.  Langevoort & Robert B.  Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation 
After the JOBS Act, 101 Geo. L.J. 337 (2013); Hillary A. Sale, !e New “Public” Corporation, 74 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. 137 (2011); Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1012 (2013).
108 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2797, n.19 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Hobby Lobby itself has over 13,000 employees, 600 stores nationwide, and $3 billion 
in annual revenue. Many other large privately owned companies exist, including the 
veritable giants of Cargill ($134.9 billion in revenue and 143,000 employees) and Koch 
Industries ($115 billion in revenue and 100,000 employees).109 RFRA provides federal 
statutory protection of religious liberty that goes beyond what is protected by the 
Free Exercise Clause.110 Such protection is within the scope of congressional authority 
and is subject to change and clarification.
4. Conclusion
In ruling that closely held business corporations can seek religious liberty protec-
tions under RFRA, the Hobby Lobby Court relied on state corporate law to provide a 
framework for corporations to pursue a religious purpose or identity. Close attention 
to the Court’s own treatment of corporate law issues reveals, however, several com-
plexities that the Court left unexplained or ambiguous. The result is a landmark deci-
sion that allows corporations to avoid generally applicable laws based on the religious 
objections of shareholders and provides only a murky explanation of the corporate 
law mechanics for establishing and limiting this liberty.
This chapter has aimed to advance the important project of understanding Hobby 
Lobby and corporate religious liberty in the context of corporate law and theory. 
Further, this chapter has argued that, like Citizens United before it, Hobby Lobby adds 
weight to the work of corporate law in ordering the rights of organizations and their 
political and religious roles, meriting future examination.
109 Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/companies/cargill/; http://www.forbes.com/companies/koch- 
industries/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
110 See supra note 15.
